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Introduction
Recent proposals brought forth by the Bush Administration advo-
cate the allocation of spectrum through the use of auctions.' Although
supporters of these plans frequently point to the potential revenue that
could be generated by this mechanism, auctions have long been recog-
nized in economics as an efficient means of allocating resources.2 Besides
allowing a seller to determine the true value of a sale item, a well-crafted
auction also awards the contested object to the bidder who values it the
most. Thus, an auction simulates the competitive market.
This article provides an overview of auction theory and suggests an
auction mechanism for the allocation of spectrum. Although auctions
can be effective vehicles for distributing resources, the potential modifica-
tion of various auction rules could disadvantage participants in any fu-
ture bidding process. For example, rules could be imposed that prevent a
firm from winning a spectrum auction even when economic theory states
that the firm should be the winning bidder. Conversely, an auction could
be structured so as to reduce the revenue received by the government
from the sale of spectrum. This article will therefore only focus on a
bidding mechanism that does not disadvantage either the seller (i.e., the
federal government) or the buyer in a spectrum auction.
This article begins with a brief discussion of the theory behind auc-
tions and why this mechanism has been advocated for spectrum alloca-
tion, followed by a description of the four primary types of auctions.
Theoretical and empirical evidence will be used to show how economic
efficiency is influenced by these different auction procedures. This article
then discusses the risks associated with auctions and concludes with a
recommended auction format for the allocation of spectrum.
1. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 146 (1991); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S.
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 114 (1991).
2. It should also be noted that auctions have also been advocated for other lines of busi-
ness in which communications companies may want to participate in the future. Harold Dem-
setz, for example, has proposed that firms compete in an auction to provide a monopoly
service. Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J. L. & ECON. 55, 58 (1968). The winner
(i.e., the one with the lowest charge to customers) would not have to be rate of return regu-
lated. Id. Similarly, auctions have also been used or proposed for cable television and cellular
telephone service. See generally, Michael A. Crew & Mark A. Zupan, Franchise Bidding for
Public Utilities Revisited, in COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF UTILITIES 173
(Michael A. Crew ed., 1990); Evan Kwerel & Alex D. Felker, Using Auctions to Select FCC
Licensees (Federal Communications Commission, OPP Working Paper No. 16, 1985); Mark
A. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some
Systematic Evidence, 32 J. L. & ECON. 401 (1989). But see generally, Oliver E. Williamson,
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J.
EcON. 73 (1976).
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I
Auction Theory and the Allocation of Spectrum
The first reported use of auctions occurred during the 6th century
B.C. when the Babylonians annually sold women of marriageable age on
condition that they wed.3 Since that time, auctions have been used for
such varied purposes as contracting for interstate highway construction,4
selling used airplanes,5 and marketing rare art.6 Although these exam-
ples would appear to have little in common, the key attributes of these
auction sales are that competition occurs on only one side of the market
and pricing information is limited.
Unlike a competitive market, auctions are characterized by an envi-
ronment where either buyers vie for the right to purchase a good from
one vendor or sellers compete to sell their products to one purchaser.
For example, the seller of a used car may know how much he previously
paid for the car, but may not know what price this object would com-
mand in the current market. Even though this vendor could sell his car
to the first person who offered him money, the seller could never be sure
if this was the highest price he could have received from a sale. By setting
up a system in which all the potential buyers are allowed to compete for
the car, an auction reveals the market price to the seller.
An auction for this car also leads to the most efficient use of this
item. If a used car was sold to someone who bid less than the auction
price and the car was then broken up for scrap, society might be worse
off than if another person made a higher payment and used this car for
travel. By transferring the used car to the individual who values it the
most, an auction guarantees that society's resources are used efficiently.
As with the sale of used cars, most economists prefer auctions over
the current system of spectrum management.7 Because users are not
forced to bear a direct cost for their spectrum allocation, the present pro-
3. RALPH CASSADY, JR., AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 26 (1967).
4. Stuart C. Thiel, Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 884, 888-
89 (1988).
5. CASSADY, supra note 3, at 17.
6. See generally Jorge Contreras, The Art Auctioneer: Duties and Assumptions, 13 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 717 (1991). Auctions have even been used to determine who would be
emperor of Rome. After killing Pertinax in 193 A.D., the Praetorian Guard sold the crown of
the Roman Empire to the person who bid the most in auction. Didius Julianus, who paid each
man of the Guard 6,250 drachmas, lasted as emperor for only two months before he was
overthrown and killed by Septimius Severus. This is another example of the truth in the state-
ment, "Caveat Emptor." CASSADY, supra note 3, at 29.
7. For example, see R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. &
ECON. 1, 17 (1959); Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the
Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499,
1529 (1969); Kwerel & Felker, supra note 2, at 26.
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cedure of spectrum management may not promote an efficient use of so-
ciety's resources. Allocative efficiency could be enhanced using an
auction because prices bid for spectrum would reflect the cost to society
for use of that resource. Rather than being zero, the cost of spectrum
from an auction may more clearly represent the opportunity cost of pro-
viding a radio-based service-in the market.
The idea of selling spectrum to potential users was first proposed in
1969.8 Besides advocating the use of auctions to sell spectrum, Arthur
De Vany et al. proposed that portions of radio frequency be purchased
on a time, area, and spectrum (TAS) basis.9 A buyer of spectrum under
the TAS system would not only have the right to use his allotted spec-
trum during a given time of day within a specified area, but would also be
allowed to negotiate with other TAS owners to alter the specifications of
his allocation if necessary.° Under this system, transaction and enforce-
ment costs could be reduced and social welfare could be increased. After
setting up the initial auction, the FCC could play a largely passive role as
market forces would regulate spectrum.
Although the TAS concept has not been formally embraced by the
FCC, the allocation of spectrum through the use of auctions has gained
support by various groups within the government. 11 As noted by Kwerel
and Felker, spectrum auctions are superior to lotteries and comparative
hearings in terms of cost and processing time.12 An auction typically
costs only fifteen percent of the expense of either hearings or lotteries.a
Processing time for an auction is three months as compared to twelve
months for a lottery and eighteen months for a comparative hearing. 14
Thus, Kwerel and Felker concluded that auctions reduce the indirect
costs associated with the current system of spectrum management. 15
Unlike the United States, New Zealand has already embraced the
idea of using auctions to allocate spectrum. 16 The New Zealand Ministry
of Commerce recently held auctions to award the rights for the 'A' block
8. De Vany et al., supra note 7, at 1559; see also, Douglas W. Webbink, Radio Licenses
and Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights, COMM. L., June 1987, at 3-4, 25-26.
9. De Vany et al., supra note 7, at 1512.
10. Id. at 1512-18.
11. Kwerel & Felker, supra note 2, at 21.
12. Id. at 17.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 19. But see, Severin Borenstein, On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for
Operating Licenses, 103 Q. J. ECON. 357, 382 (1988).
16. For further details on this process in New Zealand, see Kuehl, New Zealand Reeling
in Profits from Auction of Cellular Spectrum, RADIO COMM. REP., at 1; NEW ZEALAND MIN-
ISTRY OF COMMERCE & NERA, MANAGEMENT OF THE RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM IN
NEW ZEALAND (1988); Bruce Slane, Trading in the Radio Spectrum: A New Management
Rights Approach, N. Z. L. J. 396 (1989).
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American Mobile Phone Standard (AMPS) and both the 'A' and 'B'
blocks of the Total Access Communications Standard (TACS).17 This
bidding process, which yielded an estimated NZ$20 million (or $11.9
million in current U.S. dollars) for the New Zealand Government,"8 is
now being considered by Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 9
This move by other countries to a market-based system for spectrum
management may ultimately disadvantage the U.S. in future competition.
II
Types of Auctions
Auctions are classified according to the set of rules governing the
exchange. These rules not only determine the ultimate price bid in the
auction, but also establish the final resource allocation. Since the
landmark paper by William Vickrey,20 auctions have been broken down
into four basic types.2
A. English
This auction (also called the oral, open, or ascending-bid auction) is
the bidding form most commonly used for selling goods.22 In the Eng-
lish auction, each bidder states his price until only one bidder remains.2 3
When no bidder chooses to further increase his bid, the highest bidder
wins and pays the bid amount.24
The significant feature of this type of auction is that each competitor
knows the current high bid and can judge whether or not to continue in
the auction. In order to be successful in this type of auction, a contestant
must construct a strategy involving the firm's bids as a function of its
own valuation of the good, its prior estimate of other firms' valuation,
and the past bids of all the other firms.25 An English auction requires a
bidder to anticipate his competitors' actions.
17. Kuehl, supra note 16, at 1.
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY:
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE, 95 n.316 (1991).
19. Id.
20. William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J.
FIN. 8 (1961).
21. For more detail on the following types of auctions, see generally R. Preston McAfee &
John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LrT. 699 (1987); Paul Milgrom, Auctions
and Bidding: A Primer, J. EcON. PERSP., Summer 1989, at 3.
22. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 702.
23. ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION To GAME THE-
ORY 247 (1989).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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B. Dutch
The Dutch auction is the converse of the English auction. In this
auction the seller announces a bid, which she continuously lowers until
some buyer stops her and takes the object being bid on at that price.2 6
This type of auction, though rare in the United States, is used for selling
cut flowers in the Netherlands, fresh fish in Israel, and tobacco in
Canada.27
The bidder in this type of auction follows a simple strategy involving
her valuation and her estimates of what the other competitors would bid.
A bidder attempts to maximize her benefit by stopping the bidding at a
price which is below her valuation but above the estimated price any one
of her rivals would select. If a bidder misjudges her rivals' bids, then this
contestant may lose the auction even though she may value the item the
most.
C. Sealed Bid
In the sealed bid (also known as the first-price sealed bid) auction,
each bidder submits one bid, in ignorance of the other bids, and the high-
est bidder pays the winning amount.28 Because a participant is allowed
to make only one bid, a competitor's strategy is highly dependent on the
firm's own valuation of the contested item and its prior beliefs about
other firms' valuations. 29 A successful bid in this type of auction will be
enhanced by expending resources to estimate all of the contestants' valu-
ations of the good.
This type of auction, which has been used by the Federal govern-
ment for the sale of offshore mineral rights and procurement contracts,30
is cited as a defense against collusion.31 Although Isaac and Walker have
found that a sealed bid auction can foster a "bid-rigging" cartel, collu-
sion among competitors can easily be thwarted by only one non-cooper-
ating bidder.12 Furthermore, by not announcing what any of the
competitors bid in a sealed bid auction, the possibility of collusion is fur-
ther reduced.33 Members of the cartel cannot be sure if all the partici-
26. Id. at 249-50.
27. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 702.
28. RASMUSEN, supra note 23, at 247-48.
29. Id. at 247.
30. See generally, Walter J. Mead et al., Competition in Outer Shelf Oil and Gas Lease
Auctions: A Statistical Analysis of Winning Bids, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 95 (1986).
31. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, Information and Conspiracy in Sealed Bid Auc-
tions, 6 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 139, 151-52 (1985).
32. Id.
33. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 725. But see Issac & Walker, supra note 31, at
152.
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pants in the bidding ring actually bid their predetermined price. Finally,
it has been demonstrated empirically that a sealed-bid auction generates
the same amount of revenue to the seller as an open auction.34
This auction mechanism is strategically equivalent to the Dutch
auction because the same strategy is employed for each of these types of
auctions. The only choice open to a bidder in either of these auctions is
to determine the highest price he is willing to pay to win the contested
good and what is the top bid that he expects any of his rivals to offer.
Because both of these auction forms employ the same strategy, the win-
ner and the winning price should always be the same in either the Dutch
or sealed bid auctions.
D. Sealed Second-Bid
In 1961, William Vickrey proposed a new type of auction called the
sealed second-bid format (also referred to as a second-price sealed bid or
Vickrey auction)." In this type of auction, each bidder submits one bid,
in ignorance of the other bids.36 The bids are opened and the highest
bidder pays the amount of the second highest bid.37 The dominant strat-
egy employed in this type of auction is simply to bid one's own valuation
of the contested object.3"
In advocating this type of auction, Vickrey pointed out that in a
sealed second-bid auction "[e]ach bidder can confine his efforts and at-
tention to an appraisal of the value the article would have in his own
hands, at a considerable saving in mental strain and possibly in out-of-
pocket expense."39 Unlike the other bidding formats in which the bidder
has to estimate both his value for the item and how much his competitors
will offer for the contested good, a contestant in a second-bid auction
only reveals to the auctioneer how much she is willing to spend for the
item. A bidder who bids less is more likely to lose the auction, but pays
the same price if she does win.' Although the winning bidder may have
the highest bid (i.e., internal value for the object), the actual price paid by
the winning bidder is only equal to the second highest bid.
34. Robert G. Hansen, Sealed-Bid Versus Open Auctions: The Evidence, 24 ECON. IN-
QUIRY 125, 136 (1986).
35. Vickrey, supra note 20, at 21.
36. RASMUSEN, supra note 23, at 249.
37. Id.
38. Vickrey, supra note 20, at 20.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id. at 20; see supra subpart 11(c).
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Besides providing protection from collusion through the use of
sealed bids41 and a reduction in costs associated with bidding (because
knowledge of competitors' value for the good are not necessary), this
auction mechanism also brings one of the advantages of an open auction
in which a price is found that only one competitor is willing to pay. Al-
locative efficiency and an increase in market information both result from
a Vickrey auction in theory.42 In short, a sealed second-bid auction of-
fers consumer safeguards, cost minimization, and efficient prices.
E. Comparison
One of the key conclusions from Vickrey's analysis is that all four of
these auctions result in the same price on average.43 Although Vickrey
demonstrated this result using a model based on four simplifying as-
sumptions," the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem does not imply that the
outcomes from these four auction forms will always be the same.45 In an
English or sealed second-bid auction the winning price equals the valua-
tion of the bidder with the second highest valuation. On the other hand,
the winning bid in the first-price sealed bid and Dutch auctions repre-
sents the expectation of the second-highest valuation. Even though the
actual and expected second-highest valuations will be the same on aver-
age, the winning bid may be different for a specific object. Vickrey's
analysis has shown that the type of auction a seller chooses does not
matter.
The key to evaluating these auctions is seeing how they compare as
various assumptions are relaxed and the model more closely resembles
the real world. When bidders are not symmetric (i.e., bidders can be
divided into classes), the first-price sealed bid auction yields a different
result from the English format.46 If an auction for spectrum, for exam-
ple, can divide bidders between incumbents and new entrants, a sealed
bid auction will not yield the same price as an English auction. In other
words, a first-price sealed bid auction in this example would yield an inef-
ficient economic outcome.47
41. But see, Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price
Auctions, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 351, 357 (1988).
42. Vickrey, supra note 20, at 21-22.
43. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 710.
44. These four assumptions are: (1) the bidders are risk neutral; (2) the bidders have
independent private values; (3) the bidders are symmetric (i.e., bidders cannot be divided into
groups); and (4) payment is a function of the bids alone. Id. at 706.
45. For a simple derivation of this result, see John G. Riley, Expected Revenue from Open
and Sealed Bid Auctions, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1989, at 41, 42-43.
46. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 714.
47. Id. at 715.
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Likewise, these four types of auctions can be modified so that the
final price is not a function of the winning bid. For example, in the gov-
ernment auction of oil rights, the winning bidder not only pays his bid
but also returns a royalty based on the amount of oil extracted. 8 In any
of these auctions, if the seller charges a fixed royalty rate and calls for
bids to purchase the resource, revenue to the seller is increased. In other
words, the use of royalties increases the bidding competition in auctions.49
As with charging a royalty, sellers in these four auctions can also
increase their receipts by setting a reserve or minimum price.5° Many
auctions set a reserve price which must be met or exceeded in order to
buy the contested object.5 By establishing a base price which is below
the highest valuation but above the second highest assessment, a seller
raises the price which must be paid by the successful buyer.
Increases in information also raise the level of competition within
any auction.52 If the government has estimates of the true value of spec-
trum, for example, a release of this information may raise the final price
paid to the Treasury. Because new information tends to raise the value
estimates of bidders who would bid low, the price paid in an auction will
likely increase when a buyer releases information.
On the other hand, economic theory tells us that risk averse buyers
will raise the winning price in the sealed-bid and Dutch auctions.53 If a
buyer is afraid to lose an auction, then the bidder is likely to bid in these
auctions his true valuation of an item. If the government in a spectrum
auction is faced with potential buyers who must have spectrum, then it
would be in the government's interest to use either a sealed-bid or Dutch
auction to exploit the bidder's fear of losing.
III
Auction Risks
As can be seen from the preceding section, a seller can craft an auc-
tion to maximize his revenues. Although a seller could charge a royalty
or assess an entry fee on all bidders, these modifications can only be ex-
pected to generate an increase in revenues when various assumptions are
48. Mead et al., supra note 30, at 95.
49. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 718.
50. John G. Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. EcON. REV. 381,
389 (1981); McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 713.
51. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21, at 713.
52. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 18, at 722; Urs Schweizer & Thomas von Ungern-
Sternberg, Sealed Bid Auctions and the Search for Better Information, 50 ECONOMICA 79, 83
(1983).
53. Riley, supra note 45, at 48.
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relaxed. In general, simple auction forms are the best mechanism for
bidding.
The problem with all auctions, regardless of the form, is the "win-
ner's curse." The winner's curse refers to the incorrect estimation of the
value of a good. For example, if bidders are competing in a procurement
auction, the winning bidder will be the one who is willing to charge the
smallest payment from the firm. If all competitors have the same cost
function (including a random error term), then the winning bidder will
be the competitor that most severely underestimates the true cost. Stated
another way, the winner's curse refers to the successful bidder being the
one in an auction who overstates the value of the contested item the
most. 4
In order to make money in a competitive bidding situation (and
avoid the winner's curse), a bidder needs to adjust his bid for the incor-
rect estimation of the contested item's value. Although various empirical
studies have shown that the winner's curse has not occurred in bidding
for offshore oil rights" or highway construction contracts,56 this phe-
nomenon may occur with a spectrum auction. Because this is a new pro-
cess for most participants, bidders in a spectrum auction may not know
to adjust their bids for the winner's curse.
IV
Proposed Auction Format for Spectrum
As can be seen from the previous sections, auctions may be crafted
that disadvantage buyers. If auctions are viewed purely as a revenue-
producing mechanism by the government, then rules can be established
to maximize the price paid by any spectrum bidder.57 Besides adopting
royalty payments, the federal government could, for example, establish a
spectrum auction which includes payments from all bidders for the
chance to enter an auction or require losing bidders to pay an amount
related to their unsuccessful bids. The government, in this scenario,
would be intent on maximizing revenues at the expense of economic
efficiency.
54. For further details on the winner's curse, see Milgrom supra note 21, at 4-6.
55. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Study of an Auction with
Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865, 882 (1988); Mead et al., supra note 30, at
110. But see E.C. Capen et al., Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, 23 J. PETROLEUM
TECH. 641, 643 (1971).
56. Thiel, supra note 4, at 894.
57. McAfee & McMillan, supra note 21 at 733 (further discussion on how a seller could
craft an auction to maximize revenues); see also, Jeremy Bulow & John Roberts, The Simple
Economics of Optimal Auctions, 97 J. POL. EcON. 1060, 1063 (1989).
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In order to counter this possibility, an auction policy based on eco-
nomics should be adopted. A spectrum auction that does not disadvan-
tage either the buyers or the seller of spectrum would most likely
promote economic efficiency and ultimately the nation's competitiveness.
An auction should be crafted that results in a minimum amount of bid-
der preparation, offers protection from collusion, and results in an effi-
cient outcome.
The bidding mechanism that most closely fulfills these specifications
is a sealed second-bid auction. Besides providing protection from collu-
sion through the use of sealed bids, a Vickrey auction provides a simple
strategy for bidders to follow. Estimates of the other bids are not neces-
sary in this type of auction while economic efficiency is promoted. This
type of auction has been criticized due to the possibility sellers will cheat
or.that buyers will be opposed to full disclosure.58 However, a Vickrey
auction could be effectively implemented by the government if bidders
were informed about the proper strategy to use and safeguards that were
in place to guard against cheating.
Although a reserve price tends to raise the final auction price, a min-
imum price may be necessary in a spectrum auction. If there is very little
free spectrum in a given frequency range, an auction for spectrum for a
new service would require the movement of the existing users to another
frequency. The reserve price for a spectrum auction should therefore be
the cost of compensating the current users. Any difference between the
final price and the reserve could then be returned to the Treasury.
In order to avoid the winner's curse, the government should release
as much information to prospective bidders as possible. Even though
this will have a similar effect to implementing a reserve price, many pro-
spective bidders in a spectrum auction will be new to an auction and will
be unsure on how to value spectrum. Release of government informa-
tion, such as the reserve price or estimates of its potential revenue gener-
ation, will raise bids but will also help to prevent the selection of a poorly
informed bidder.
Finally, no firm should be precluded from participating in an auc-
tion for spectrum simply because it is alleged to have "deep pockets."
This is an argument that is sure to be leveled against the large firms that
wish to bid on spectrum. This argument goes as follows: auctions favor
the large firms that have sizable cash reserves or other considerable finan-
cial resources and disfavor other efficient providers that lack such finan-
cial resources. This faulty reasoning may lead to some very inefficient
58. Michael H. Rothkopf et al., Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 94,
101-03 (1990).
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policies if it is followed. As long as efficient capital markets are available
to participants choosing to bid for spectrum, then the "deep pockets"
argument is without merit. Moreover, empirical evidence from auctions
for offshore oil leases shows that small firms have been able to bid com-
petitively with large firms.59 No bidder should be precluded from a spec-
trum auction simply because it is cash rich or financially healthy, and
certainly such participation should not handicap smaller firms that can
use existing capital market resources in making bids for spectrum.'
V
Conclusion
Although spectrum auctions have been cited by the government as a
way to increase general revenues, auctions can provide positive benefits
to the economy. Besides allowing a seller to determine the true value of a
sale item, well-crafted auctions can also result in the winning bidder be-
ing the one who values the contested object the most. Thus, an auction
may provide an efficient means of allocating resources.
If a bidding process is mandated for spectrum, the author advocates
the adoption of a sealed second-bid auction. Besides providing protec-
tion from collusion, this type of auction offers a simple strategy for bid-
ders to follow. Estimates of the other competitors' bids are not necessary
with this auction format. Although many firms may oppose bidding for
spectrum because they could be paying substantial amounts for a re-
source which they now control at no cost, a properly constructed spec-
trum auction could provide positive benefits for the national economy.
59. Mead et al., supra note 30, at 110.
60. But see, Janine S. Natter, note, Scarcity of the Airwaves: Allocating and Assigning the
Spectrum for High Definition Television (HDTV), 13 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 199, 225
(1991) (arguing that allocating the spectrum for HDTV to the highest bidder does not neces-
sarily serve the public interest).
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